paper-writing

Integrity Forensics — thin launcher for Anti-Autoresearch

Audit target: $ARGUMENTS

> What this is. ARIS generates papers; Anti-Autoresearch ↗

> is its outward-pointed dual — reviewer-side integrity forensics (46 patterns

> across 8 families, deterministic GRIM/GRIMMER/statcheck core, span-anchored

> claims, a rules-only reporter that summarizes rather than adjudicates). This skill is a

> thin launcher: it pins an upstream commit, validates the pin with the

> upstream eval gate, delegates execution unchanged, and post-processes the

> verdict into ARIS's policy vocabulary. It vendors nothing and forks nothing.

> 🔁 Cadence fence (shared-references/external-cadence.md): this skill is

> verdict-bearing decision support. Do not wrap it in /loop / /schedule —

> and NEVER as "iterate edits until it stops flagging" (see The One Forbidden

> Loop below).

Constants

• ANTI_AR_REPO = https://github.com/wanshuiyin/Anti-Autoresearch.git
• ANTI_AR_COMMIT = b47af6f983b38347b6d2110379e266400597cf66 — the SHA-pin.

The launcher NEVER tracks upstream HEAD; bumping this constant is a reviewed

change (see Pin-bump checklist).

• CLONE_DIR = ~/.aris/anti-autoresearch — the pinned working copy. Host-neutral

on purpose: ARIS also runs on DeepSeek Harness, Codex CLI, Cursor, Trae,

Antigravity and Copilot CLI, where ~/.claude/ would name an installation the

user does not have. An older clone at ~/.claude/anti-autoresearch is unused;

move it and its .aris_eval_ok_* receipt only to keep an offline

deterministic-only run working, otherwise delete it whenever convenient.

• NO REVIEWER KNOBS. This launcher exposes no reviewer model/effort

parameters and never maps ARIS — effort: onto upstream settings. The

pinned upstream runs exactly what it pins (gpt-6-astra + xhigh, its own

design decision). Overriding upstream review policy from a launcher would

create a second, unauditable configuration surface.

• GATE_HELPER = forensics_gate.py — resolved via the canonical chain

(shared-references/integration-contract.md §2): .aris/tools/ →

tools/ → $ARIS_REPO/tools/ → $ARIS_REPO/tools/ via ~/.aris/repo.

Failure policy A (required): if it cannot be resolved at

assurance: submission, STOP — never improvise the gate.

Step 0 — Bootstrap the pin (idempotent)

CLONE_DIR="$HOME/.aris/anti-autoresearch"
ANTI_AR_COMMIT="b47af6f983b38347b6d2110379e266400597cf66"

mkdir -p "$HOME/.aris"
if [ ! -d "$CLONE_DIR/.git" ]; then
    git clone --no-checkout https://github.com/wanshuiyin/Anti-Autoresearch.git "$CLONE_DIR"
fi
# fetch ONLY if the pin isn't already present — a cached, validated pin works offline
git -C "$CLONE_DIR" cat-file -e "$ANTI_AR_COMMIT^{commit}" 2>/dev/null \
    || git -C "$CLONE_DIR" fetch -q origin
git -C "$CLONE_DIR" checkout -qf "$ANTI_AR_COMMIT" || {
    echo "FATAL: cannot checkout pinned commit $ANTI_AR_COMMIT"; exit 1; }
# Force a PRISTINE tree at the pin — local tampering with the clone (edited
# adjudicator, injected module, even one hidden inside a NESTED git repo,
# which single-f clean skips) must not survive bootstrap and run under the
# official pin's name. Every step is checked; then the tree is verified.
git -C "$CLONE_DIR" reset --hard -q "$ANTI_AR_COMMIT" || {
    echo "FATAL: reset to pin failed"; exit 1; }
git -C "$CLONE_DIR" clean -ffdxq || {
    echo "FATAL: clean failed"; exit 1; }
[ -z "$(git -C "$CLONE_DIR" status --porcelain)" ] || {
    echo "FATAL: clone is not pristine after reset+clean — refusing to run"; exit 1; }

# One-time-per-pin validation: the upstream eval gate (8 injected-defect
# classes, 100% recall + zero clean false positives) must PASS before this
# pin is allowed to produce a verdict. NEVER skip; NEVER proceed on failure.
# The marker lives OUTSIDE the clone: a marker inside a tamperable tree proves
# nothing (and `git clean` above would erase it, forcing re-eval every run).
MARKER="${CLONE_DIR}.aris_eval_ok_${ANTI_AR_COMMIT}"
if [ ! -f "$MARKER" ]; then
    ( cd "$CLONE_DIR" && python3 eval/run_eval.py ) || {
        echo "FATAL: upstream eval gate FAILED at pin $ANTI_AR_COMMIT — refusing to"
        echo "       use an unvalidated forensics pin for verdicts."; exit 1; }
    touch "$MARKER"
fi
echo "anti-autoresearch pinned at $ANTI_AR_COMMIT (eval gate: validated)"

Step 1 — Delegate: run the upstream sweep, unchanged

Open and follow $CLONE_DIR/workflows/anti-autoresearch/SKILL.md end to

end on the target. Two wrapper rules — the ONLY things this launcher adds:

1. cwd. Upstream skills self-locate via git rev-parse --show-toplevel.

Run every upstream bash block with cd "$CLONE_DIR" first — ALWAYS the cd,

never just an exported ROOT (upstream blocks re-derive ROOT themselves

and would overwrite it) — and refer to the paper by absolute path,

otherwise upstream resolves ROOT to the ARIS repo and finds the wrong

Python spine.

2. Codex calls carry approval-policy: never + sandbox: read-only

(session hygiene; upstream already specifies fresh-thread-per-dimension,

serial execution, and its own model pins — do not alter them).

Everything else — the evidence ledger, coverage.json state machine, the nine

auditor dimensions, the refutation pass, the deterministic summary — is

upstream's contract. Never rewrite, soften, or re-map its outputs

(report.json + REPORT.md, verdict ∈ CLEAN_GIVEN_EVIDENCE / SOFT_FLAGS /

HARD_FLAGS / REVIEW_UNAVAILABLE). The observability level (L0/L1/L2) is

whatever upstream derives from the artifacts present — do not promise L2.

Step 2 — Typed gate + obligations (ARIS-side post-processing)

# Resolve $GATE_HELPER via the canonical chain (integration-contract §2), then
# ONE atomic call (update + gate in a single locked transaction — the gate only
# ever speaks for the report the ledger has folded, sha-bound):
python3 "$GATE_HELPER" evaluate --report "$PAPER_DIR/report.json" --paper-dir "$PAPER_DIR" \
    --anti-ar-commit "$ANTI_AR_COMMIT" --executor-model "<this pipeline's executor>"
# exit 0 = WARN / NO_NEW_BLOCKER · exit 1 = BLOCK

The gate translates the verdict into policy WITHOUT re-labeling it:

| upstream verdict | policy |

|---|---|

| HARD_FLAGS | BLOCK — an auditor proposed something critical and it is on the table for you to read; never "the machine found fraud" |

| REVIEW_UNAVAILABLE | BLOCK — an incomplete sweep cannot wave a paper through |

| SOFT_FLAGS | WARN — human disposition. Read the never-ran list too: the upstream verdict folds incompleteness in only when it would otherwise be clean, so a WARN can sit on top of a sweep where verdict-bearing dimensions never ran. evaluate and fresh both print those dimensions |

| CLEAN_GIVEN_EVIDENCE | NO_NEW_BLOCKER — *never* called PASS or accepted: it means "no flag found in the evidence at hand", not an acquittal |

| anything else | BLOCK (fail closed) |

plus: any OPEN critical obligation → BLOCK; any OPEN obligation → at least

WARN; a closed-without-receipt or unknown-status ledger entry → BLOCK (a

hand-edited "status": "RESOLVED" does not open the gate).

gate.json also records a paper_fingerprint (sha over the paper's compile

inputs AND deliverables — .tex/.bib/.sty/.cls/figures/PDF). The

downstream preflight is ONE command:

python3 "$GATE_HELPER" fresh --paper-dir "$PAPER_DIR" --anti-ar-commit "$ANTI_AR_COMMIT"

— exit 0 ⟺ the gate was produced at the CURRENT pin ∧ a gate

exists ∧ nothing in the paper changed after it ∧ the gate matches the current

obligations ledger ∧ the decision — **re-computed from the sha-verified

archived report (last_report.json) + the live ledger, never read from the

gate's stored token** — is pass-capable (WARN / NO_NEW_BLOCKER). Anything

else — missing gate, post-gate edit or recompile, unbound ledger or archive,

recompute mismatch, BLOCK, unknown token — exits 1: re-run the sweep +

evaluate. Every ledger mutation (update/resolve/waive) deletes the

standing gate.json, so an interrupted run can never leave a stale pass; and

evaluate refuses a report OLDER than any paper file (a stale report cannot

be folded onto text it never audited). Run evaluate immediately after the

sweep, before touching any paper file.

The gate artifact also records honest provenance: upstream's auditors are

GPT-family, so for a Claude executor the findings carry cross-family

proposal provenance; for a Codex executor they are same-family. Either

way this gate only raises flags — it has no acceptance to grant, so the

distinction is informational, not a loophole.

Step 3 — Fix what it found (obligations, not a polish loop)

Every OPEN obligation gets DISPOSITIONED — fixed, or explicitly waived. Upstream now

reports every proposal an auditor made rather than deciding which ones do not count, so

expect more obligations than a pre-2026-08 sweep opened, and expect some of them to be

proposals you disagree with. waive is a first-class, expected outcome — "a model

proposed this and I, the human, judge it wrong" is a normal disposition here, not a last

resort. Weigh each one against the report's columns: Anchored, Observability,

FP-risk, Surface, Ext-check.

For the ones that are real, use the right door:

| Finding family | Repair route |

|---|---|

| A — numeric self-consistency | recompute from the RESULT FILES (/paper-claim-audit evidence chain); fix the number, not the sentence |

| D — experiment integrity | back to /experiment-audit / rerun |

| E — citations | /citation-audit KEEP/FIX/REPLACE machinery |

| G — proof & derivation | /proof-checker's fix loop |

| B / C / H — scope, baselines, eval design | science-level: feed the finding to /auto-review-loop as reviewer INPUT, or to the human |

| AIS / advisory (zero-weight) | optional context for /auto-paper-improvement-loop; never gates |

Close each obligation explicitly — the receipt is typed and hashed:

python3 "$GATE_HELPER" resolve --paper-dir "$PAPER_DIR" --obligation-id <id> \
    --fix-type corrected-from-results|claim-narrowed|claim-withdrawn|citation-replaced \
    --evidence <path-to-the-ground-truth-that-backs-the-fix> \
    --verified-by "human:<name>" | "checker:<tool>" | "cross-family-review:<thread-id>"
# or, with HUMAN sign-off only:
python3 "$GATE_HELPER" waive --paper-dir "$PAPER_DIR" --obligation-id <id> \
    --approver "human:<name>" --reason "<why this stands as-is>"

Rules the ledger enforces mechanically (tests/test_forensics_gate.py):

• append-only — re-running the sweep can open obligations, never close them;
• a finding that *disappears* from a later report stays OPEN and gains

UNRESOLVED_DISAPPEARANCE — rewording the span is not a fix;

• claim-withdrawn is an honest fix (deleting an unsupported claim is a

legitimate resolution — with the deletion diff as evidence);

• a waiver is not a resolution: human-approved, permanently recorded,

original finding snapshot immutable;

• the executor's fix_type label is a receipt, not a verdict — closure of a

critical needs a family checker, a fresh cross-family review, or a human

(--verified-by requires TYPED provenance and is recorded; naming a human

who did not approve is a false record with a permanent paper trail);

• receipts are re-verified, not remembered: on every later gate the

evidence file must still exist and still hash to what was recorded at

closure time — editing the evidence after closing re-opens the BLOCK;

• resolve/waive (like update) invalidate the standing gate.json —

finish Step 3 by re-running the sweep + evaluate, so the gate that

downstream preflights read reflects the post-fix state.

The One Forbidden Loop

Never run "edit → re-sweep → repeat until CLEAN". That objective function

teaches the editor to defeat the detector — deleting an anchored span kills a

flag faster than fixing the number, and the result is a paper laundered

against its own audit. The re-run after fixes exists to confirm the

DISCREPANCY is gone (and to catch new ones); the obligations ledger — not the

verdict — decides whether the gate opens.

Trust boundary (what is computed vs what is protocol)

• Computed (the gate enforces these mechanically): verdict→policy mapping,

append-only ledger lifecycle, sha bindings (report ↔ ledger ↔ archive),

receipt re-hashing, the paper fingerprint, pin/version match, and the

recomputed decision (fresh never trusts a stored token).

• Protocol (instruction-graded, deliberately): that the sweep actually ran

at the pinned clone against this paper. The gate raises the bar —

structural floor (a report must name its adjudicator and carry a coverage

map), stale-report mtime guard — and that is where it stops. There is no

cryptographic binding between the report and the paper, deliberately: this is

a research-workflow gate, not a provenance system, and the honest statement is

that a determined executor can hand it a stale report. Likewise human: / checker: / cross-family-review: labels are

accountability, not authentication: a false label is an explicit,

permanent false record.

• Out of scope: a party rewriting the .aris/ artifacts consistently with

shell access has owner power (they could delete the directory outright).

The gate defends against the sloppy or corner-cutting executor and against

honest crashes/races/resumes — not against the machine's owner.

Pin-bump checklist (maintainers)

1. Set the new ANTI_AR_COMMIT; delete no markers (the eval gate re-runs

automatically for the new SHA).

2. Diff upstream's schemas/report.schema.json + verdict vocabulary against

the gate's policy table; extend tools/forensics_gate.py BEFORE bumping if

they moved.

3. Old findings/obligations stay valid (fingerprints are span/hash-based, not

id-based) — but findings produced by an older adjudicator must be

re-audited, not re-adjudicated (upstream's own migration rule).

4. Tell users when a bump changes how much they must disposition. fresh

rejects every stored gate.json at the old pin with PIN_MISMATCH, so a

bump already forces a re-sweep for everyone — bundle upstream changes behind

ONE bump rather than two, or the re-sweep cost is paid twice.

> 2026-08 bump (98a75fc) — expect more open obligations. Upstream moved

> from adjudicating proposals to reporting them: findings its FP-risk,

> observability, surface and needs-external-check gates used to demote to info

> now arrive above info, so they open obligations. Nothing got worse in the

> paper; more of what the auditors said is now visible. Waiving a proposal you

> judge wrong is the expected disposition, and the report's per-finding columns

> (Anchored, Observability, FP-risk, Surface, Ext-check) are what you

> weigh. Upstream also deleted its report self-binding hashes in the same window

> — nothing here ever consumed them.

Codex-native note (mirror)

Upstream ships no Codex-native pack; its auditor skills are Claude-Code

contracts. A Codex-native session may run upstream's **deterministic-only

mode** (numeric core + adjudicator with an all-review_unavailable coverage

map — honestly scoped: it can flag, it can never say CLEAN). The full

nine-dimension sweep requires a host that can execute upstream's Claude-Code

contracts unchanged — Claude Code and the dsh-aris bundle on DeepSeek Harness

are the known ones. Translating upstream's

reviewer calls into spawn_agent on the fly is REWRITING an upstream

contract — forbidden.

Review tracing

Upstream saves its own per-dimension traces under the paper's

.aris/traces/. The launcher adds only the .aris/forensics/ artifacts:

gate.json (pins anti_ar_commit + report/ledger hashes + the paper-text

fingerprint), obligations.json (the append-only ledger), and

last_report.json (the sha-verified archive of the folded report that

fresh recomputes from).