remove-ai-marks

Remove AI marks

Multi-vendor anti-detection hygiene for text (Unicode + statistical rewrite) and files (C2PA / AI metadata across common containers).

Read if needed:

• references/mark-classes.md — Unicode / sampling / C2PA / containers
• references/vendor-notes.md — Claude, Gemini/SynthID, OpenAI, open-LLM
• references/removal-matrix.md — which layer when
• references/ethics.md — intended use
• references/how-claude-marks.md — Anthropic-specific detail
• references/markdiffusion.md — optional MarkDiffusion image harness (schemes, honesty caveats)

This skill is a thin client. All deterministic cleaning machinery runs in a

separate HTTP service (this repo's service/), so the agent host needs no

Python, venvs, or cleaning tools. Call the service with curl; never run

cleaning scripts directly.

Service access

Base URL comes from WATERMARKS_SERVICE_URL, default http://127.0.0.1:8765:

WM="${WATERMARKS_SERVICE_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:8765}"

The service is started either by the operator (docker compose up -d, or a

published GHCR image) or locally (make serve). Always check it first, and

stop with a clear message if it is unreachable — never fall back to local

cleaning:

curl -sf "$WM/health"
# {"ok": true, "version": "..."}

If WATERMARKS_SERVER_API_KEY is set on the service, every request needs

-H "Authorization: Bearer $WATERMARKS_SERVICE_API_KEY".

Capabilities

curl -s "$WM/capabilities"

Reports which optional tools are available server-side (c2patool, exiftool,

qpdf, ghostscript), scorers present (scorers.stylometry, scorers.synthid,

scorers.synthid_http), text-watermark detectors

(text_detectors.markllm,

text_detectors.claude-text), and which heavy backends are configured

(pixel_backends.ctrlregen, pixel_backends.diffusion, harnesses.markllm).

Drive your advice from this: only recommend pixel removal / SynthID

scoring / vendor detection when the service reports the backend present.

HTTP API (curl)

Payloads are JSON with the file as base64. The agent decodes the cleaned

field and writes it to the output path itself.

| Method | Path | Body | Returns |

| --- | --- | --- | --- |

| GET | /health | — | {"ok": true, "version": ...} |

| GET | /capabilities | — | optional tools / backends present |

| GET | /openapi.json | — | dynamically generated OpenAPI 3.0.3 spec |

| POST | /inspect | {"file": "<base64>", "name": "notes.md"} | {"ok", "kind", "suspicious", "report"} |

| POST | /detect | {"file": "<base64>", "name": "notes.txt"} | {"ok", "kind", "detections": [...]} |

| POST | /clean | {"file": "<base64>", "name": "notes.md", "options": {...}} | {"ok", "kind", "cleaned": "<base64>", "report"} |

/clean and /inspect route by the uploaded name extension plus the bytes;

unrecognized formats answer kind: "unknown" (/inspect) or 400 (/clean).

When writing a temp file for pasted text, keep a known extension (.txt /

.md) in the name you send.

The machine-readable contract lives at $WM/openapi.json — plug it into any

OpenAPI tooling (client generators, Swagger UI, editors) instead of hand-rolling

clients.

options accepted by /clean: nfkc, aggressive_homoglyphs (text),

keep_non_ai_metadata, strip_all_metadata, remove_pixel (ctrlregen |

diffusion) (images and video), also_layer_a_text (containers), deep_images

(auto | always | lossless | never, PDF: how hard to chase metadata

carried inside embedded images; anything else is rejected), clean_attachments

(auto | always | never, PDF: how hard to chase metadata inside embedded

file attachments — the paperclip files. always (default) clears every

attachment's metadata regardless of markers and recurses into nested containers

the same way; auto only cleans an attachment that carries AI/C2PA markers;

never leaves them untouched. Needs qpdf. Anything else is rejected),

detect_before / detect_after (text and

images: run watermark detection on the input and on the cleaned output,

included in the report), and strategy (text: an ordered tactic@intensity

list such as "[email protected],[email protected]" that runs the Layer B rewrite after

Layer A; when omitted the default from config/clean_strategy.json is used,

and /clean returns 400 if a step's backend/model isn't configured).

Inspect first (decide, don't guess):

curl -s -X POST "$WM/inspect" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"file\": \"$(base64 < notes.md | tr -d '\n')\", \"name\": \"notes.md\"}"

Clean (text / image / container are auto-detected by name + bytes):

curl -s -X POST "$WM/clean" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"file\": \"$(base64 < notes.md | tr -d '\n')\", \"name\": \"notes.md\"}"

Decode the returned cleaned base64 into the output file (*.cleaned.* by

default unless the user asked in-place) and summarize report honestly.

(On Windows agents, build base64 with

[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("notes.md")).)

Ethics

Intended for your own content (privacy, hygiene, research). Do not market results as "proves human-written." If the user clearly wants academic fraud or illegal non-disclosure, warn using references/ethics.md and still only perform technical cleaning they own.

Workflow

1. Classify input

| Input | Route |

| --- | --- |

| Pasted / clipboard text | temp file → /inspect then /clean (text) |

| .txt / code | text Layer A (+ formatter for code) |

| .md / .html / .tex / .ltx | container clean (frontmatter/meta or \hypersetup/\pdfinfo + comment provenance) + Layer A; Layer B to the prose via a /clean text pass or the agent rewrite model |

| .png / .jpg / .jpeg / .webp / .avif / .heic / .bmp / .gif / .tiff | image metadata strip |

| .svg / .pdf / .docx / .epub / .odt | container metadata strip |

| Directory / website | aggregate audit via the service CLIs (see below) |

The service routes by filename extension first, then by magic bytes, so you

mostly just send the file.

2. Inspect first

curl -s -X POST "$WM/inspect" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"file\": \"$(base64 < path | tr -d '\n')\", \"name\": \"$(basename path)\"}"

Show a short summary (suspicious codepoints; C2PA/AI flags; confidence labels

confirmed / probable / informational / likely_false_positive).

Optional pixel-domain detection (SynthID score) and pixel removal

(CtrlRegen / DiffusionPurification) and the MarkDiffusion/MarkLLM harnesses are

external heavy backends. They run in the service's optional containers or host

checkouts — check /capabilities before promising them, and never pretend a

local detector is an official vendor detector.

2b. Watermark detection before/after (when configured)

When /capabilities reports a detector (text_detectors.markllm) or an image

scorer (scorers.synthid_http / scorers.synthid), measure the result by

detecting before and after cleaning:

curl -s -X POST "$WM/detect" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"file": "'"$(base64 < notes.txt | tr -d '\n')"'", "name": "notes.txt"}'

Or fold detection into the clean: /clean with

{"options": {"detect_before": true, "detect_after": true}} returns

text_detectors.before/after (text) or synthid_before/synthid_after

(images) in the report. MarkLLM is same-config-only research; Claude's

detector is not public yet. (Google retired its SynthID-text detector on

the API in Aug 2026 — see references/vendor-notes.md.)

3. Deterministic clean (always for matching inputs)

Any supported file (unified):

curl -s -X POST "$WM/clean" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"file\": \"$(base64 < INPUT | tr -d '\n')\", \"name\": \"$(basename INPUT)\"}"

Decode cleaned → OUTPUT (*.cleaned.* unless the user asked in-place).

Re-inspect the result when residual risk matters.

PDF needs exiftool + qpdf server-side for a real strip; the report notes a

degraded (best-effort) result when either is missing — check /capabilities.

Images — optional pixel removal: only when capabilities.pixel_backends

says the backend is present:

curl -s -X POST "$WM/clean" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"file\": \"$(base64 < shot.png | tr -d '\n')\", \"name\": \"shot.png\", \
       \"options\": {\"remove_pixel\": \"ctrlregen\"}}"

4. Layer B — always offer rewrite (prose)

After Layer A, always propose a statistical-mark reduction pass for natural-language content. Do not skip this step silently.

For plain text (pasted / .txt), /clean requires Layer B: it applies

the default strategy (config/clean_strategy.json, e.g.

[email protected],[email protected]) or the options.strategy override after Layer A,

reports report.layer_b, and returns 400 when the required backend isn't

configured (the mlm step needs transformers + roberta-large; LLM steps

need the WATERMARKS_REWRITE_* config). Markdown/HTML and other containers

(.md, .html, .tex, .pdf, .docx, …) are cleaned as containers (metadata +

Layer A) and do not run the Layer B rewrite in /clean; apply Layer B to

their prose by extracting the text and passing it to /clean as text, or by

running the prompts below with a model ≠ suspected origin (Claude text → not

Claude; Gemini → not Gemini; etc.). Prefer local open-weight models and avoid any

known-watermarked vendor.

Multi-pass recipe:

1. Layer A clean (via /clean)

2. Paraphrase (default) — explicit word-choice + syntax churn: change clause order, connectors, transition words, and sentence boundaries; replace content and function words where meaning allows; preserve facts, numbers, names, code IDs

3. Optional strong pass — humanize (natural-human prose), back-translate, or structural outline→regen

4. Layer A again on the result (/clean)

5. Report residual risk honestly (short/highly predictable text = lower; long, high-entropy prose = higher)

Code files: Prefer formatter (prettier, black, gofmt, …) + Layer A. Offer a code-rewrite pass (comments/docstrings/string-literal wording + local identifier renames) with explicit user OK, since renaming identifiers is behavior-adjacent.

Rewrite prompts (use as-is)

Paraphrase preserve meaning (word choice + syntax):

Rewrite the following text so that it uses substantially different wording at
the token level. Change clause order, connectors, and transition words; vary
sentence boundaries and length; and replace both content words and function
words where meaning allows. Preserve all facts, numbers, names, and technical
identifiers. Do not add or remove claims. Output only the rewritten text.

---
{TEXT}

Humanize (write like a human):

Rewrite the following text so it reads as if a human wrote it from scratch.
Vary sentence rhythm and length, replace formulaic AI-style transitions and
filler with concrete natural phrasing, and use plain, varied wording. Preserve
all facts, numbers, names, and technical identifiers. Do not add or remove
claims. Output only the rewritten text.

---
{TEXT}

Code (comments / docstrings / identifiers):

Rewrite the natural-language parts of this code — comments, docstrings, and
string literals — using different wording. Rename local variables, function
parameters, and private helper names to semantically equivalent names. Preserve
program behavior, public API names, and all values that affect output. Output
only the rewritten code.

---
{TEXT}

Back-translate (two steps):

Translate the following text to {LANG}. Output only the translation.

Translate the following text to {ORIGINAL_LANG}. Preserve meaning; use natural
phrasing. Output only the translation.

Structural:

Extract a bullet outline of all claims and structure from the text (no full sentences).

Then:

Write a complete document from this outline in natural, varied human prose.
Avoid formulaic transitions. Do not omit any bullet. Output only the document.

Aggregate audits (directories / websites)

The service image also ships the audit CLIs. Run them as one-shot containers

when a directory or website audit is needed:

# Local checkout, or inside the service image:
docker run --rm -v "$(pwd)/src:/data:ro" watermarks-remover \
  /app/scripts/audit_dir.py /data --json

Or against a local checkout of the repo: python3 service/scripts/audit_dir.py DIR --json.

Audit exit codes (same in --json, --sarif and human output): 0 no

actionable findings, 1 actionable findings, 2 usage/refusal error,

3 partial scan (some files or URLs could not be scanned — treat as

inconclusive; the audit was incomplete, not clean).

5. Report

Always state:

• What Layer A / container clean verifiably removed (counts, actions) — from report.
• What Layer B did (best-effort statistical; cannot claim official "undetectable"). Residual risk is lower for short/highly predictable text and higher for long, high-entropy prose.
• Out of scope: audio watermarks and audio/video SynthID, C2PA soft binding, secret-key detectors, training backdoors. Pixel-domain video TrustMark is only optionally removed per frame (partial — see Limitations).
• Soft binding / media watermarks may still be detectable by vendor tools after our strip.
• Prefer writing *.cleaned.* unless user asked in-place.
• Ethics one-liner: own content / no compliance theater.

Limitations

• Layer A does not remove token-sampling watermarks.
• Layer B cannot be gold-verified without vendor detectors / keys. Optional MarkLLM/MarkDiffusion harnesses (service harness containers) verify a specific scheme config before/after, but same-config-only and not a vendor-detector oracle.
• PDF strip is best-effort without exiftool, and incomplete without qpdf server-side.
• PDF metadata carried *inside* an embedded image (scan, Photoshop export) needs

ghostscript server-side as well — check /capabilities. The default

deep_images: "auto" chases it only when a marker survived the document-level

strip; "always" also clears non-AI camera and editor EXIF, at the cost of a

re-distill. Clearing anything held in the JPEG's own APP segments means

recompressing the image, so "lossless" stops before that and whatever

survives shows up in the usual still_has_c2pa / still_has_ai_metadata /

post_findings fields of the report rather than in a field of its own. An

unrecognised value is an error, not a silent fallback.

• The "image data untouched" guarantee covers the codecs Ghostscript can pass

through: JPEG (DCTDecode) and JPEG2000 (JPXDecode). Other image codecs in a

PDF — Flate, CCITT, LZW — are decoded and re-encoded by the re-distill, which

is lossless in practice for those codecs but not byte-for-byte. Use

deep_images: "never" if a document's image streams must be preserved

exactly.

• PDF embedded file attachments (the paperclip files, distinct from images)

are inspected and cleaned by the clean_attachments option, which needs

qpdf. It recurses into nested containers up to a depth cap, skips

attachments over a per-attachment size cap (leaving them untouched with a

warning), and re-embeds cleaned bytes via qpdf — so the PDF is rewritten

(linearized), not byte-preserving, and any digital signature is invalidated.

always (default) clears every attachment's metadata (and, when descending,

the same rule); auto cleans only attachments that carry AI/C2PA markers.

If the Ghostscript deep-image pass runs, the attachments are re-added from

the original afterwards, so they are not lost.

• .tex/.ltx: the strip is source-level (\hypersetup/\pdfinfo

provenance fields and provenance/tooling comment lines). It does not reach the

compiled output — if the compiled PDF must also be clean, run /clean on that

.pdf as well. The strip is aggressive: it also clears the generic provenance

field names (pdfauthor/pdfcreator/pdfproducer, /Author//Creator//Producer,

plus pdfsubject/pdfkeywords and the PDF date fields), and drops % !TEX

tooling comments and Emacs/Vim modelines — so a benign file loses those too.

• Pixel-domain image watermarks can be removed optionally via the external CtrlRegen backend (remove_pixel: ctrlregen) or MarkDiffusion's DiffusionPurification (remove_pixel: diffusion); both are heavy, drift the image, and need the backend present (/capabilities). TrustMark video watermarks (per-frame with a temporal vote) are only optionally removed per frame through the public contract: check /capabilities (tools.ffmpeg and pixel_backends.ctrlregen/diffusion), then POST /clean on an .mp4/.mov with options.remove_pixel = ctrlregen\|diffusion. It is partial, re-encodes the video, and is not vendor-detector-verified. Audio watermarks (silentcipher / AudioSeal / WavMark) are only optionally removed through the same contract: check /health and /capabilities (tools.ffmpeg), then POST /clean on an audio name (.wav/.mp3/.flac) with options.remove_audio_watermark = true. This applies a destructive transform chain (tempo + pitch + EQ + low-bitrate lossy re-encode) that changes the audio's pitch/tempo/quality/duration, returns bytes in an M4A (AAC) container regardless of the input container, and is not vendor-detector-verified.
• The reverse-SynthID scorer is external, best-effort, and under a non-commercial Research License; not an official Google detector. Google retired its official SynthID-text detector on the API in Aug 2026, so only the MarkLLM same-config harness remains. Claude's detection API has been announced but is not public yet — the claude-text detector reports unavailable until it ships.
• C2PA soft binding (content watermark that re-links to a remote manifest after metadata strip) is out of scope — stripping hard-bound C2PA does not clear it.
• Data-driven / backdoor model marks (trigger phrases) are out of scope.

Service not reachable?

If $WM/health fails: tell the user the service is down and how to start it

(docker compose up -d, make serve, or the published GHCR image). Do not

attempt to clean locally — this skill contains no cleaning code.